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Transgender in the Workplace guidance and Custody Standard Operating Procedure

Date of request: 23 February 2025
Reference: 278-25

Request

The request has been copied below, in bold. Our responses follow each question.

Response

Please provide a copy of the most recent of the following documents, please also indicate if there are any further iterations awaiting approval.

  1. Most recent Transgender in the workplace policy.

 

No policy is held on this subject. I have provided a copy of our procedural guidance document, Transgender and Non Binary Inclusion in the Workplace. Please find this attached (Disclosure 1).

 

  1. Most recent EIA for the Transgender in the workplace policy, specifically any considerations regarding use of changing rooms and toilet facilities.

 

Please find attached (Disclosure 2) the Equality Impact Assessment for the Transgender and Non-Binary Inclusion at Work guidance.

 

  1. What groups, both internal and external, were consulted with in the preparation of the policy.

 

The procedural guidance and EIA have been reviewed and revised/amended by colleagues within our HR department and Performance and Assurance department. The departments and roles of those who have approved the guidance can be seen on page 3. Consultation is still ongoing, and will involve feedback from staff networks including the Family & Gender Network.

 

  1. Most recent custody protocol incorporating strip searching process. 

 

Please find attached our Custody Standard Operating Protocol 2024 (Disclosure 3). The section on Strip and Intimate Searches can be found from page 43.

  1. Most recent custody EIA for custody protocol.

 

No EIA is held in relation to the Custody Protocol.

 

  1. What groups, both internal and external, were consulted with in the preparation of the protocol.

 

The protocol has been reviewed and revised/amended by colleagues within our Criminal Justice department. The role and rank of the signatories can also be seen on pages 2 and 3.

 

 

Within the document provided for question 4, redactions have been made to remove contact details where these are not meant for public use and disclosure could lead to disruption of our policing processes. Additionally, staffing levels, shift patterns and minimum staffing levels have been redacted. These redactions have been made under the following exemption:

 

  • Section 31(1)(a) Law Enforcement

 

This is a qualified, prejudice based exemption, therefore there is a requirement to articulate the harm in disclosure and to consider the public interest.

 

Harm in Disclosure:

To disclose email addresses and phone numbers used for policing purposes would release information into the public domain that could be used by those intent on disrupting police services to interrupt operational policing.

 

To disclose staffing levels, minimum staffing requirements and shift patterns would cause operational harm and affect our ability to prevent and detect crime. If operational information is disclosed about officer and resource deployment figures and timings, it could enable individuals or groups intent on committing crime to do so at times when they believed they had a reduced chance of being detected.

 

 

Arguments favouring disclosure:

To disclose direct means of communication with police departments displays transparency and accountability. To disclose the details relating to staffing levels would provide public reassurance by demonstrating that we have sufficient allocation of resources in this area.

 

Arguments favouring exemption

Disclosure of direct contact details not intended for general public use could result in teams being inundated with enquiries that do not pass through the usual route of our command and control system. Each enquiry received would have to be dealt with individually, which would abstract officers from their usual operational duties. In addition, those with criminal intent could use this information to cause disruption to the communication channels within organisation. This could lead to operational difficulties as resources would need to be replaced in order to manage operational demand and maintain public safety.

 

If the force is highlighted as having a different police presence within custody at some times and locations than others, individuals with the intention of committing an offence may target locations or act during times with a lower police presence believing that their chances of committing undetected crime and evading arrest would be higher.

 

Established, abstracted and minimum staffing levels (as defined on page 25 of disclosure document 3), are in place to ensure there are sufficient resources available at any given occasion. However, if criminals believe there to be an opportunity to take advantage of such information they will do so with the resulting negative effect to law enforcement. If there is a risk that the future law enforcement role of the constabulary could be compromised and individuals’ safety put at risk, it cannot be justified that the public interest would be served in releasing this specific information if either of these aspects were to be compromised in any way.

 

Balance Test

As the contact details are not intended for public use, these aspects of the redacted information would be of little use other than to those seeking to cause disruption. In relation to staffing levels, the benefit of providing information that reflects the efficiency and effectiveness of the force must be measured against the risk of disclosing information which would increase the risk of crimes being committed. On balance, the harm in disclosure outweighs any public interest in releasing the information. The decision is therefore to withhold the requested information in the interests of protecting our law enforcement capabilities.

 

 

Within the documents provided for questions 1, 2 and 4, names and other identifying information have been redacted, in line with the following exemption:

 

  • Section 40(2) Personal Information

Any information to which a request relates is exempt if it constitutes personal data and would contravene any of the data protection principles.  Personal data relates to a living individual who can be identified directly from the information, or identifiable indirectly in combination with other available information.

This is an absolute exemption if disclosure would breach any of the data protection principles.  This means that we cannot be compelled to disclose information in the public interest.

A Freedom of Information disclosure is a disclosure to the world. Therefore, information that is provided can be viewed by any member of the public. Should information be provided from which a living individual could be identified this would constitute a breach of rights provided under the Data Protection Act 2018.  Information held on an individual by Avon and Somerset Police is done so lawfully and is used for a policing purpose in line with the principles set out in the UK GDPR. Our privacy policy can be viewed here.

This serves as a partial refusal notice under section 17(1) of the FOI Act.

 


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